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In their  Anachronic Renaissance, Alexander Nagel and Christopher Wood identify two principles
upon which,  in fifteenth-century Europe, a work of art  might establish its validity  or authority:
substitution and performance.1 One of the recurring themes in the responses to this much debated
book has been its indebtedness to Hans Belting’s Bild und Kult.2 Specifically, it has been routinely
suggested that the dual schema of substitution and performance follows Belting’s dualism of the
medieval cult of the image and the modern aesthetic system of art. This, I submit, is not just a
mistake, but also prevents from evaluating perhaps the book’s most ambitious contribution to art-
historical theory on its own merits. An analysis of the structure of the claims made by Nagel and
Wood brings to light that the two concepts—substitution and performance—do not play the same
role as the conceptual pair of Bild and Kunst in Belting’s influential work.
In the reactions to Anachronic Renaissance, a lot of attention has been paid—and rightly so—to the
substitution principle. This proved to be one of the most highlighted as well as most controversial
topics  of  the  book.3 The  criticisms  of  “substitutability”  range  from  its  being  too  vague,4 too
schematic,5 to its distorting its subject because of an alleged postmodern bias.6 What ended up more
1 Alexander Nagel and Christopher S. Wood, Anachronic Renaissance (New York: Zone Books, 2010), 13, 31.
2 Hans Belting, Bild und Kult: Eine Geschichte des Bildes vor dem Zeitalter der Kunst (Munich: Beck, 1990).
3 The principle was already discussed in Christopher S.  Wood,  Forgery, Replica, Fiction: Temporalities of German
Renaissance Art (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 25–60.
4 Frank Fehrenbach, review of Anachronic Renaissance, by Alexander Nagel and Christopher S. Wood, caa.reviews,
March 8, 2011, doi:10.3202/caa.reviews.2011.30.
5 Gerhard Wolf, review of Anachronic Renaissance, by Alexander Nagel and Christopher S. Wood, Art Bulletin 94, no.
1 (2012): 139.
6 Walter Cupperi, “Introduction: Never Identical; Multiples in Pre-Modern Art?,” in Multiples in Pre-Modern Art, ed.
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detrimental to its reception, however, was its association early on with Belting’s work. According to
Gerhard  Wolf,  “if  one  sees  the  authors’  substitutional  model  as  the  medieval  one  and  their
performative  one as that  of the Renaissance,  it  is  clear  that  Anachronic  Renaissance follows a
structure analogous to the shift from Bild to Kunst in Bild und Kult.”7 For Frank Fehrenbach, “it is
not  difficult  to  recognize  Belting’s  opposition  of  ‘art’  versus  ‘cult’  behind”  the  concepts  of
performance  and  substitution.8 Keith  Moxey  observed  that  “the  imaginative  elaboration  of  the
concepts  of  ‘substitutional’  and  ‘performative’  [is  derived]  ultimately  from”  Bild  und  Kult.9
Katherine  Hunt  even  suggested  that  Nagel  and  Wood  applied  Belting’s  ideas  “somewhat
uncritically.”10 In a recent authoritative overview of the research into the epistemic role of images in
early modernity, Alexander Marr notes Nagel and Wood’s indebtedness to Belting as a matter of
course, proving that the association has achieved the status of received wisdom.11
Hunt’s remark notwithstanding, commentators usually hasten to add that Nagel and Wood do not
just  slavishly  apply  Belting’s  schema,  but  that  they  provide  a  more  nuanced  approach  that
complicates the somewhat over-simplifying narrative of a switch from the veneration of the divine
through image to a secularized aesthetic  experience of art.12 What remains unchallenged is that
when Nagel  and Wood speak of  substitution  and performance,  they  roughly  refer  to  the  same
processes as Belting when he discusses  Bild and  Kunst, though the claim is nowhere to be found
Walter Cupperi (Zurich: Diaphanes, 2014), 20.
7 Wolf, review of Anachronic Renaissance, 137.
8 Fehrenbach, review of Anachronic Renaissance.
9 Keith Moxey, review of Anachronic Renaissance, by Alexander Nagel and Christopher S. Wood, Contemporaneity:
Historical Presence in Visual Culture 1 (2011): 153, doi:10.5195/contemp.2011.35.
10 Katherine Hunt, “Substitution and Subversion: Two Paths through the Renaissance,” Art History 35, no. 4 (2012):
842.
11 Alexander Marr, “Knowing Images,” Renaissance Quarterly 69, no. 3 (2016): 1006.
12 E.g., Jeffrey Hamburger, “Hans Belting’s  Bild und Kult: eine Geschichte des Bildes vor dem Zeitalter der Kunst,
1990,” Burlington Magazine 153, no. 1294 (2011), 44.
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explicitly stated in the book itself. Such a reading misconstrues the distinction Nagel and Wood
introduce. In order to get a clearer view of the difference involved, it is important to disentangle two
meanings of “substitution” relevant to art history.
Nagel and Wood’s principle of substitution,  or “of continuity of identity across a succession of
substitutions,”13 treats art as a “structural object,” with a specific artwork serving as the token of a
type.14 An art  object  may be substituted by another material  object,  provided it  partakes  of the
identity features of the type. These features secure its legitimacy and efficacy as a member of a
chain of substitutions usually leading back to a mythical act of creation. By contrast, the principle of
performance,  or  of  authorship, traces  an  artwork’s  origin  to  a  specific  creative  gesture  and its
authority and efficacy rests in its material identity over time and “nonsubstitutability.”15 Under the
substitution principle, an icon may have been repainted several times, even replaced altogether, or
may  have  existed  in  several  versions  at  different  places,  but  all  its  material  occurrences  were
perceived as true instances of the type, often with no sense of contradiction.  This was possible
because the icon was perceived both as if it were a relic materially linked to its original appearance
and as if it were a piece of writing that may be rewritten any time on a different material without
any loss  of  identity.  The  principle  of  substitution  under  which  all  the  instances  of  a  type  are
perceived as identical; the lack of means to identify at all precisely (and a lack of interest in doing
so)  the  time  and  place  of  origin  of  specific  instances;  and  the  general  tendency  of  removing
religious imagery from the flow of secular time made it easier to treat replicas as originals. As
Nagel and Wood argue, with the rise of humanist scholarship, with the influx of Byzantine icons
that  were  often  taken  (mistakenly)  to  be  authentic  works  of  Christian  antiquity,  and  with  the
emergence  of  the  cult  of  the  Great  Artist,  the  incompatibility  of  the  substitution  and  the
performance principles was becoming growingly apparent with the result that this incompatibility
13 Nagel and Wood, Anachronic Renaissance, 14.
14 Ibid., 12.
15 Ibid., 14, 60.
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itself became the subject of many Renaissance artworks.16
On the rare occasions when Nagel and Wood employ Belting’s term Bild, they use it in Belting’s
sense, that is, to describe the power of holy images to make the divine present.17 The term does
describe a kind of substitution, namely, the potential of a picture to stand in or act on behalf of
another body or agency.  In his  Bild-Anthropologie, Belting identified the substitutive function of
images—variously referred to as Verkörperung, Stellvertretung, Ersatz—to be as old as the making
of images itself and connected it to the desire to provide the deceased (and by analogy, the absent)
with an ersatz-body, contrasting it with the Western identification of mimetic image with a medium
of  remembrance.18 But  crucially,  that  is  not  the  meaning  the  term  “substitution”  carries  in
Anachronic Renaissance. 
The concept of substitution Nagel and Wood apply is at a remove from Belting’s notion. Instead of
asking how art objects become effective, whether as surrogate agents or as aesthetic representations,
they ask rather how their acquired authority is sustained through time and space. The performance
and the  substitution  principles  offer  two patterns  of  this  sustenance,  two ways  of  securing  the
survival of an established link between an art object and its source of authority. Thus, for example,
the “models” of the Holy Sepulcher, which sprang up across Europe in the early centuries of the
second millennium played not only the role of memorials and “physical reminders,” but also of
substitutes, tokens participating on the identity of the type. Only because they could be treated as
identical  to  the  Holy  Sepulcher  could  they  function  as  sites  of  veneration—centers  of  “virtual
pilgrimages.”19 And something similar applies to the Byzantine icons of the Virgin imported to the
West in the fifteenth century: Nagel and Wood discuss copies of the supposed original icon painted
by St Luke from the Church of Santa Maria del Popolo in Rome being presented as both replicas
16 Ibid., 71, 109–22, 147–58.
17 Ibid., 118, 122.
18 Hans Belting,  Bild-Anthropologie: Entwürfe für eine Bildwissenschaft (Munich: Fink, 2001), 143–88. 
19 Nagel and Wood, Anachronic Renaissance, 60–61.
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and as authentic works of the evangelist.20
In a sense close to how Belting thinks about substitution, already the supposedly genuine St Luke
icon in Rome and the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem are substitutes, just not in the sense Nagel and
Wood  have  in  mind.  Because  the  Holy  Sepulcher  in  Jerusalem  was  the  place  of  Christ’s
resurrection, it can stand in for him as the subject of veneration. Because the icon was painted by
the evangelist’s hand and “from life,” it is a relic-like index of the presence of Virgin Mary and thus
can stand in for her.21 But the substitution principle Nagel and Wood describe does not address this
relationship between the absent agency and its representation.22 What it addresses is how an art
object’s identity is secured across time and space. So while the replicas of Madonna del Popolo
stood in for what they represented in Belting’s sense of substitution, they secured this privileged
relationship both by instantiating features of her type (substitution principle) and by their claim to
material identity (nonsubstitutability).
In Nagel and Wood’s narrative, the growing awareness of the incompatibility between the relic-like
character of a supposedly authentic art object like the Madonna del Popolo and its identity secured
through substitution was resolved in favor of its relic status: in the end, the involvement of any act
of substitution was denied. It is this denial of substitution in favor of performance that has swayed
commentators to view Nagel and Wood’s narrative through Beltingian lens: the substitutive logic of
Bild is superseded by the performative logic of Kunst. But such a reading misses that the authorial
performance principle effectively inherits its relying on nonsubstitutability from what can be called
‘the relic principle’.23 In other words, the medieval principle of relic is the same as the principle of
authorial performance of the High Renaissance to the extent that both of them secure the identity of
20 Ibid., 109–15.
21 See Horst Bredekamp, Der Bildakt, 2nd. ed. (Berlin: Wagenbach, 2015), 181, 187, 193.
22 As Wolf also notices in his review of Anachronic Renaissance, 137.
23 “Somewhat surprisingly,” adds Fehrenbach in his review of Anachronic Renaissance; but the surprise arrives only
when one expects a Beltingian break between substitution and performance.
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an object by its nonsubstitutability. It would then follow that contrary to the Beltingian reading of
Anachronic  Renaissance,  it  is  not  that  the  performance  and  substitution  regimes  coexisted
(uneasily) in the Christian West only during the fifteenth century, making it a sort of a buffer zone
between the Era of Substitution and the Era of Performance,  but rather that something like the
performance principle,  that is, the relic principle coexisted with the substitution principle in the
preceding centuries as well.24 
As the tension between performance and substitution grew throughout the fifteenth century, Nagel
and  Wood  argue,  it  became  exploited  by  the  Renaissance  artists  for  artistic  purposes.  Their
notorious example is Botticelli’s Portrait of Youth Holding an Icon (ca.1480). In this painting, the
authors claim, a fourteenth-century icon is inserted into a fifteenth-century panel painting in order
to exemplify the different ways of securing authority. If it indeed was placed there by Botticelli or
his contemporary—which is  far  from certain25—it represents a highly self-aware gesture of the
nascent artistic culture: the icon serves to exemplify a whole “system of image transition.” It is a
picture  manifested  as  antique  and  sustained  across  time  by  substitution.  It  contrasts  with  the
authorial way of securing artistic authority exemplified by the modern-day portrait: not through a
chain of substitutions, but by the supreme authorial gesture. Here, we encounter what Nagel and
Wood describe—in a move to distance themselves from Belting—as the creation of a retrospective
myth of the Bild, the cult image immune to history, as opposed to a modern portrait manifesting its
embeddedness in a secular time.26 But working against this myth, I would argue, is the painting’s
celebration of progress, acknowledging at the same time the icon as its predecessor, and thus also as
the product of an authorial gesture, stripping it of part of its substitutional magic and anchoring it,
24 Clair Farago and Donald Preziosi’s criticism of Nagel and Wood thus misses its target, see their Art Is Not What You
Think It Is (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), xi–xiii.
25 See Fehrenbach, review of Anachronic Renaissance.
26 Ibid. ,  128.  See  also  Valentina  Hristova,  “Pour  une  lecture  intelligible  d’Anachronic  Renaissance:  contenu  et
critiques,” Studiolo, no. 9 (2012), 315.
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as it were, in the secular time. The substitution principle, confronted with the authorial principle,
does not vanish,  but  transforms itself  – just  like the relic  principle  morphed into the authorial.
Botticelli’s painting presents itself not just as a relic of a performance that brought it into the world
(the index of the artist’s action), but also as an instantiation of a type, of a genre of portraiture for
which the inserted icon serves as a venerable predecessor that lends it legitimacy. Granted, situating
a painting  in  a linear  historical  genealogy is  hardly the same thing as placing  it  in  a  chain  of
functionally identical substitutes. What remains, however, is the intention to endow an artifact with
authority by identifying it with a class of authoritative objects, in Botticelli’s case by constructing a
Whiggish history of the progress of portraiture painting.
I  have  argued  that  Nagel  and Wood  do not  present  just  another,  if  more  nuanced,  version  of
Belting’s  story of  the  shift  away from substitution.  First,  their  use of  substitution  differs  from
Belting’s in that it describes primarily a model for sustaining the identity and authority of an art
object and not the nature of the relationship to what it represents. And second, the transformation
narrated  by  Nagel  and  Wood  could  best  be  described  as  a  change  of  relation  between  the
substitution and performance principles rather than as a move from one to the other. In the fifteenth
century,  a  sense  of  the  incompatibility  between  substitution  and  performance  takes  shape  and
becomes a problem for artists to tackle. But that does not mean that some version of both principles
was not at play before and perhaps also after this incompatibility became an artistic problem. As
models of securing authority for an artwork, both seeing an artwork as a relic of a performance that
brought it into the world (the index of an action) and seeing it as an instantiation of a type may
prove much more general and widespread to be each associated with incompatible artistic cultures
that briefly clashed in the fifteenth century before the one succeeded the other.
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